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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
vs. 
TERRY JOHNSON, Case No. 20050169 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, TERRY JOHNSON 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Mr. Johnson appeals from a final order of the Third District Court involving the 
denial of his motion for a new trial upon conviction. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42. 
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court should hear appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on direct appeal? Standard of Review: Whether the record is adequate to permit 
a decision. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Ct. App. Utah 1993). 
2. Whether defense counsel was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution? Standard of Review: Whether defense counsel's 
perfonnance was objectively unreasonable, and whether such failures materially 
prejudiced Mr. Johnson to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel's errors, the fact finder would have found reasonable doubt as to Mr. Johnson's 
culpability for the crime ofmurder. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
3. Whether prosecutorial misconduct merits reversal? Standard of Review: 
Whether the prosecutor's behavior called to the attention of the jurors matters which they 
could not properly consider in determining the verdict, and whether Mr. Johnson was 
materially prejudiced. State v. Colwell, 994 P .2d 177 (Utah 2000). 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing certain Rule 404(b) 
evidence. Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. State v. Gurbransen, 106 P .3d 734, 
740 (Utah 2005). 
CITATION TO RECORD FOR PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
1. The ineffective assistance of counsel claims are as follows: 
(a) defense counsel failed to object to grossly prejudicial use of impermissible 
Rule 404(b) evidence. This issue is plain from the record ( R. 615, p. 141, 1. 1 0-14; R. 
617' p. 513, 1. 1 0). 
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(b) defense counsel failed to object to certain material and prejudicial statements 
made by him to his ex-spouse under the marital privilege. This issue is plain from the 
record ( R. 615, p. 159, I. 9-11). 
c) defense counsel failed to object to appellee's misstatement of material facts as 
to the time of death for the murder. This issue is plain from the record ( R. 617, p. 488, I. 
4-I5). 
(d) defense counsel failed to object to appellee's use of inflammatory remarks 
during closing argument. The issue is plain from the record ( R. 617, p. 525, I. 12; 527, I. 
5; 529, I. 5). 
(e) defense counsel failed to elicit effective impeachment from appellee's DNA 
expert. The issue is plain from the record ( R. 6I7, p. 435-438; 528, I. I-II). 
(f) defense counsel failed to call a DNA expert as a rebuttal witness (Record in its 
entirety; Addendum I). 
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct Merits Reversal. This is a related issue to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the arguments are is referred to in argument 
sections, no. I, 2 and 4 ofthe brief. The issue is plain from the record as stated supra. 
III. The Trial Court abused its discretion by allowing certain Rule 404(b) evidence 
pertaining to Mr. Johnson's acts of domestic violence, as a foundation for his drug habit. 
The issue is plain from the record ( R. 617, p. 575-82, Addendum B). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The relevant part of the Sixth Amendment to the United Sta1es Constitution reads: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 24, 2002, an information was filed against Mr. Terry Johnson for 
criminal homicide, a first degree felony. Mr. Johnson was represented by the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association. A jury trial was held on June 22-24, 2004. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on June 24th to homicide murder. On August 10, 2004, Mr. 
Johnson was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five years to life 
On August 20, 2004, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial and to 
withdraw. On October 19, 2004, new counsel filed a supplemental motion for new trial, 
incorporating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
On January 25, 2005, the trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order, and denied Mr. Johnson's motion for a new trial. Among other things, the 
conclusions oflaw stated that: (1) the evidence adduced at trial which indicated that Mr. 
Johnson had choked his wife with a belt and had tried to abort her fetus by punching her 
in the stomach was not overly prejudicial under Rule 403, but was relevant under Rule 
404(b), as a foundation for introducing evidence pertaining to Mr. Johnson's drug habit; 
(2) the prosecutor did not act improperly; and, (3) defense counsel was not ineffective. 
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On February 16, 2005, Mr. Johnson filed a notice of appeal. On March 14, 2005, the 
Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42. 
On December 6, 2005, under present counsel, Mr. Johnson filed a Motion to 
Remand for Findings Necessary for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim, pursuant to 
Utah R. App. P. 23B. Mr. Johnson raised new theories for ineffectiveness and 
prosecutorial misconduct in this motion, and submitted affidavits by the DNA expert used 
by defense counsel and appellee's forensic pathologist. 
On February 8, 2006, this Court denied appellant's motion in part, because: "the 
few additional facts referenced in appellant's exhibits have no connection whatsoever to 
the arguments regarding ineffective assistance set forth in appellant's memorandum." 
On February 27, 2006, appellant filed an amended motion to renew remand for 
findings necessary for ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On May 11, 2006, this 
Court denied appellant's motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
On December 30, 1993, a fourteen year old boy by the name of Christopher Mosier 
was found stabbed to death by 35 stab wounds in his apartment by his mother, Sylvia 
Mosier ( R. 615, p. 80, 96). There were no eye witnesses to the murder (Record in its 
entirety). There was no murder weapon found (Record in its entirety). There was no 
evidence found on Mr. Johnson's body or clothing, even though he was interviewed by 
the police shortly after the murder took place ( R. 615, p. 15 2-15 3) (and despite the fact 
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that the murder involved a great deal of blood loss by multiple stab wounds). The 
testimony of the victim's mother was that Mr. Johnson had a good relationship with her 
son, and that he had no motive to kill him ( R. 615, p. 113, 1. 6-25). Thus, appellee's 
theory for motive, i.e., that Mr. Johnson, being a drug addict, needed to kill the boy so 
that he could steal something from the apartment to get money to buy drugs seems far 
fetched, especially in light of the fact that Mr. Johnson was employed at the time ( R. 617, 
p. 520; I. 7-17). 
The boy's mother testified that: (1) Chris carried a knife, because he was afraid of 
gangs ( R. 615, p. 122,1. 4, 12); (2) he collected knives; and, (3) was stopped by the 
police for carrying knives ( R. 615, p. 122). Chris used to participate in mock knife fights 
with his friend Brandon Bray ( R. 617, p. 461 ). Mr. Bray had taken classes in how to 
fight with a knife ( R. 617, p. 460), and was a martial arts instructor ( R. 617, p. 460). 
Thus, there was evidence that someone else in this gang infested neighborhood might 
have killed the boy. 
Mr. Bray told detectives that: (1) Chris was an expert knife fighter ( R. 617, p. 
462-63); (2) Chris carried two knives and a billy club ( R. 617, p. 463); (3) Chris carried 
an 11" kitchen knife ( R. 617, p. 464 ); ( 4) Chris was strong for his age ( R. 617, p. 462); 
and, (5) it would have been difficult for somebody of average weight and build to 
overpower Chris ( R. 617, p. 464). Mr. Bray also testified that: (1) Chris carried a knife 
because he was afraid of gangs ( R. 617, p. 464, 1. 5); and, (2) he thought that gangs had 
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killed Chris ( R. 617, p. 473,1.6). 
Around the time the boy was killed, Mr. Johnson went to visit a friend of his by the 
name ofMagdy Hassan ( R. 615, p. 160). Messrs. Hassan and Johnson consumed alcohol 
and crack that night ( R.615, pp. 172-73, 181-82). Mr. Johnson's demeanor was "quite 
normal and happy" on the night of the murder ( R. 615, pp. 166, l. 15-16; 152, l. 14-21). 
Mr. Johnson used the bathroom while visiting Mr. Hassan ( R. 615, p. 167). Mr. Hassan 
saw no blood on Mr. Johnson when he came to his house ( R. 615, p. 181, l. 11). Later 
that evening, Mr. Johnson called his ex-wife to let her know that he was too drunk to 
drive ( R. 615, p. 131, l. 12). Upon his ex-wife picking him up, the police immediately 
took Mr. Johnson to the Kearns station to interview him about the killing ( R. 615, p. 152, 
1.25; 153,1.1-7). 
Trial counsel never cross examined any of the several police witnesses about 
whether they discovered wounds to Mr. Johnson's body, after he had allegedly: (1) 
stabbed the decedent 35 times with a knife ( R. 616, p. 239,1. 9); and, (2) may have 
received blows from the decedent through kicks with his boots ( R. 616, p. 323,1. 1-13). 
Before trial, appellee provided written notice, that it intended to introduce certain 
Rule 404(b) evidence at trial ( R. 616, p. 227-234). The evidence consisted oftestimony 
from Mr. Johnson's ex wife, Linda Johnson, that Mr. Johnson: (1) had a drug habit; and 
(2) had stolen money and property to support his habit ( R. 616, p. 230). 
Appellee further indicated that it would introduce certain statements made by Mr. 
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Johnson, pursuant to either Rule 404(b) or 801(d)(2)(A). Those statements were that Mr. 
Johnson believed that male, teenage babysitters abused children ( R. 616, p. 228). Mr. 
Johnson's attorneys filed no written objections to the introduction of this evidence. 
On June 17, 2004, a hearing was held concerning this Rule 404(b) evidence. The 
Court ruled that: (1) appellee would have to lay a foundation for the theft evidence ( R. 
615, p. 18,1. 16); and, (2) it could introduce evidence ofMr. Johnson's drug use ( R. 615, 
p .. 20,1. 22). The Court then signed a findings of fact and conclusion oflaw which 
indicated that: ( 1) the appellee's evidence was necessary to prove intent, plan and motive 
for the crime; (2) Mr. Johnson drug activities was not overly prejudicial; and, (3) 
appellee's proposed 404(b) evidence was admissible, subject to laying a foundation ( R. 
616, p. 277-278). 
However, during trial, appellee suddenly introduced additional and incredibly 
damaging 404(b) evidence, for which it had not provided prior notke. That is, it 
introduced evidence through Mrs. Johnson that Mr. Johnson had: (1) pushed her; and, (2) 
put a belt around her throat when she was pregnant, and had wanted to kill her and her 
fetus (R. 615, p. 141,1. 10-14). Mr. Johnson's attorneys failed to: (1) object to the 
introduction of this evidence; (2) move to strike the evidence with a cautionary jury 
instruction to disregard the evidence; and/or, (3) move for a mistrial. Appellee never 
offered a theory as to why this evidence, although incredibly prejudicial, was relevant, 
pursuant to Rule 404(b ), or how it was foundational to Mr. Johnson''s drug habit. It also 
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failed to show why notice should be waived for good cause, in conformity with the rules 
of evidence. 
Post-conviction, Mr. Johnson's second lawyer moved for a new trial, based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel as to the 404(b) evidence. The trial court, in denying 
this motion, held that: "Specific incidents of domestic violence were elicited as 
foundation for defendant's statements [as to his drug habit]. These incidences also 
explained defendant's ex-wife's reluctance to initially reveal information against the 
defendant" (R. 575-582) (Addendum B). 
Appellee also elicited unannounced testimony from Mrs. Johnson that Mr. Johnson 
had made the following statements to her: (1) Mr. Johnson had other people killed for 
saying certain things that she had said to him ( R. 615, p. 142, 1. 13); (2) he could put his 
fist through the back ofher head ( R. 615, p. 142,1. 15); and, (3) while commenting on 
the O.J. Simpson trial, that Mr. Johnson was able to kill somebody without getting caught 
( R. 615, p. 142,1. 20-23). None of these statements were objected to by Mr. Johnson's 
trial counsel, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 502, i.e., the marital communications privilege. 
An important theory of the appellee's was that Mr. Johnson had an opportunity to 
do the crime. It posited the theory that there was only about a 5-l 0 minute opportunity 
for someone to do the crime ( R. 617, p. 518, I. 19). However, its argument grossly 
misrepresented the facts, because the window of opportunity was actually two hours. Not 
only that, but Mr. Johnson's attorney, didn't catch appellee's error, and actually agreed 
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with its time line theory ( R. 617, p. 487-88 ). In reality, the boy's mother testified that 
she did not get home until around 9:30P.M. ( R. 615, p .. 94, 1. 23). 
The Legal Defenders never cross examined any witness, e.g., Dr. Leiss, concerning 
the likelihood that even assuming Mr. Johnson had changed his clothes and washed 
himself in Mr. Hassan's bathroom, that he would still have had cuts to his hand after he 
had stabbed a struggling, martial arts trained, knife using, strong for his age victim 35 
times, or that specks of blood would have been found on his clothing and/or body (Record 
in its entirety). 
During the cross examination of the appellee's DNA expert, John Gabriel Bier, Mr. 
Johnson's lawyer failed to adduce a clear understanding of the problems with the expert's 
methodology and results. Indeed, the Court repeatedly admonished defense counsel to 
make a better record of what it was he was trying to accomplish through cross 
examination ( R. 617, pp. 438,1. 13-15; 439,1. 18-20; 440,1. 11-17, 19-20). More 
specifically, defense counsel: (1) failed to elicit from Mr. Beir by testimony as to why 
failure to obtain a substrate control was material (R. 617, pp. 434-442); (2) actually 
elicited from Mr. Beir that his lack of using a substrate control was immaterial, because 
another company, i.e., Seri, had used a substrate control (R. 617, p. 436, 1. 2-4); (3) 
elicited testimony that the odds that Seri's DNA research was wrong was 294,000 to 1 (R. 
617, p. 435, 1. 24); and, (4) elicited testimony from Mr. Beir that use of a substrate 
control was irrelevant (R. 617, p. 438, 1. 15-18). Then, during closing argument, defense 
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counsel never objected to appellee calling Mr. Beir's testimony definitive proof that it had 
matched Mr. Johnson's blood on his baby's blanket by DNA evidence (R. 617, p. 528, 1. 
11). 
Dr. Elizabeth Johnson, the DNA expert who trial counsel had consulted for trial 
states (by affidavit in Mr. Johnson's Rule 23B motions) that the cross examination failed 
to elicit a clear understanding of a variety of concepts (Addendum A). That is, her 
affidavit states that the following subjects were not adequately explained to the jury, and 
could have negatively affected Mr. Johnson's case: (1) no blood was found on the 
clothing or shoes of Mr. Johnson (an unlikely event); (2) the blood stains found on the 
baby blanket could have been there before the murder; (3) since the victim had handled 
the baby blanket on the day of the murder, it would not have been unlikely for his DNA to 
be on the blanket; (4) the DNA sample could have been contaminated; (5) and the DNA 
testing methodology could not be attributed to a blood stain, because a substrate control 
had not been tested. 
Appellee introduced evidence at trial that a certain baby blanket belonging to Mr. 
Johnson's baby had the victim's DNA on it. Indeed, appellee twice called the DNA test a 
match for the victim's blood during closing argument ( R. 617, pp. 416, 1. 12-16; 
528,1.4-14). However, the affidavit by Dr. Johnson indicates that the State's 
representations were incorrect. Defense counsel did not object to these arguments as 
well. 
II 
In closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly, explicitly and implicitly called Mr. 
Johnson a liar. She did so 12 times ( R. 617, pp. 513,1.6-12; Tr. 525,1. 12-17; Tr. 
525,1.23-25; Tr. 526, 1. 1-7; Tr. 526; Tr. 527,1. 5; Tr. 529,1. 5). She also implied that 
Mr. Johnson had obstructed justice twice ( R. 617, pp. 524,1. 17-20; Tr. 525, 1. 17-22). 
Mr. Johnson's attorneys never objected to these prejudicial and inflammatory arguments. 
The prosecutor also referred to the undisclosed 404(b) evidence during her closing 
argument ( R. 617, p. 513,1. 10-11). 
However, Mrs. Johnson also testified that at the time of the murder: (1) she was 
not afraid ofMr. Johnson ( R. 615, p. 147,1. 11-15) (thus repudiating one ofthe court's 
reasons for the relevance of the domestic violence evidence); (2) she thought that Mr. 
Johnson had no involvement with the murder ( R. 615, p. 147,1. 16-18); (3) she could not 
picture Mr. Johnson killing anyone (R. 615, p. 147,1. 19-20); (4) Mr. Johnson 
immediately returned from Mr. Hassan's home, upon learning that the police wanted to 
talk with him ( R. 615, p. 149, 1. 9-21); and, (5) on the night of the murder, Mr. Johnson's 
demeanor was calm ( R. 615. 152,1. 14-24). 
In its denial of Mr. Johnson's 23B motion for an evidentiary hearing, to obtain, 
among other things, the testimony of Dr. Johnson, this Court held that the facts pertaining 
to Dr. Johnson's affidavit had "no connection whatsoever to the arguments regarding 
ineffective assistance." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This African-American male was not given a fair trial pursuant to the mandates of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defense counsels' gross 
ineffectiveness and the prosecutor's egregious misconduct skewed the outcome of the 
trial so badly, that one cannot say with any degree of reasonable certainty, that but for 
these material errors, the jury would not have found reasonable doubt for the crime 
charged. Indeed, appellee alleges that Mr. Johnson, who was too drunk too drive home 
the evening of the murder, and who spoke to the police shortly after the murder, would 
have had the presence of mind to wipe from his body and clothes all specks of blood in a 
friend's bathroom (while consuming alcohol and drugs with the friend), and after killing a 
knife trained teenager by 35 stab wounds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INEFFECTIVE CLAIMS SHOULD BE BROUGHT 
ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
In State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court held that a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel may be brought on direct appeal if: ( 1) the 
record is adequate to permit such a decision; and, (2) the defendant is represented by new 
counsel. 
In this instance, appellant is represented by new counsel. Additionally, this Court 
in denying both of appellant's Rule 23B motions, twice cited to State v. Johnston, 13 P.3d 
175 (2000) for the proposition that "a remand is not necessary if the facts underlying the 
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ineffectiveness claim are contained in the existing record." The only reasonable inference 
to be drawn from this language is that this Court believes that appellant has articulated 
sufficient facts in his Rule 23B motions to make out a prima facie claim of 
ineffectiveness. Consequently, it would appear that under the authorities cited, an 
ineffective claim is permissible on direct appeal. 
Secondly, appellee appears to have waived any objection to hearing an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Indeed, appellee in its response in 
opposition to defendant's Rule 23B motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing, 
repeatedly argued that no such hearing was warranted, because the record was sufficient 
to address appellant's ineffectiveness claims. Thus, it follows, that if a party's failure to 
object to an issue before the court constitutes waiver, e.g., Balderas v. Starks,- P.3d -, 
2006 WL 1422568, 2006 UT App 218 (2006), a fortiori, when the party actually argues 
for the proposition, it also constitutes waiver, if the party decides to take a materially 
inconsistent position later on. 
Thirdly, this Court in denying Mr. Johnson's request for an evidentiary hearing to 
augment the record pertaining to Dr. Johnson's affidavit, stated that the need for a hearing 
was unnecessary, because the facts contained in Dr. Johnson's affidavit had "no 
connection whatsoever" to Mr. Johnson's ineffectiveness claims. :tvfr. Johnson is in 
prison and indigent. Thus, it follows that since this Court has denied Mr. Johnson an 
evidentiary hearing at this time (because the facts are sufficient on the record to proceed), 
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it would be logically inconsistent and prejudicial to Mr. Johnson for the Court to now say 
that he must allege his ineffectiveness claims as to Dr. Johnson through a habeas 
proceeding (with its attendant evidentiary hearing procedure), so that it may take 
testimony from Dr. Johnson as to her perspectives on the DNA evidence. Indeed, it 
would seem that since Dr. Johnson's affidavit it part of this proceeding, it should be 
considered as a basis for Mr. Johnson's ineffectiveness claims, on motion by this Court 
sua sponte. 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE. 
1. Failure to Object to Grossly Prejudicial Evidence 
The legal standard to determine whether trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a 
defendant must show that: ( 1) trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness; and, (2) but for these errors, there was a reasonable probability that the 
fact finder would have found reasonable doubt for the crime charged. !d. at 687-88. The 
overarching concern is not that trial counsel did some things well, or that he had a good, 
overall background in criminal law; rather, it is whether trial counsel's errors were such, 
that a truly adversarial process never took place, rendering the verdict questionable. !d. 
Unbelievably, the attorney's from the Legal Defenders, Mr. Johnson's lawyers 
failed to object to the undisclosed 404(b) evidence pertaining to his alleged choking and 
assaultive behaviors against his ex-wife, and the attempted murder of her fetus. The latter 
15 
crime is murder in Utah. State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171, 2004 UT 4, P 5 (2004), citing, 
U.C.A. S 76-5-201(1). The nature ofthe attempted murder of a fetus is of course nearly 
identical to the behavior associated with the charge here. Hence, there was an inherently 
grave danger that the jury would have inferred that Mr. Johnson had acted in conformity 
with his alleged, past violent behavior, let alone engendering its hostility. Thus, this 
evidence should have been reasonably objected to under Utah R. Evid. 403 and 404(b ). 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). Indeed, evidence that a defendant had 
previously struck his wife is not admissible in a homicide prosecution to prove that 
defendant acted in conformity with his basic character for violence under Rule 404(b ). 
/d. 
Additionally, pursuant to Rule 404(b ), appellee was required to give prior notice of 
its intent to use such evidence, ostensibly to provide a defendant's counsel with adequate 
time to mitigate or rebut such evidence, and to avoid undue surprise. Hence, it was 
incumbent upon Mr. Johnson's lawyers to object to the appellee's use of the evidence. 
In light of these facts, it was grossly unreasonable for Mr. Johnson's lawyers not to 
have: ( 1) objected to the use of this evidence; (2) requested a limiting instruction as to the 
relevance of such evidence, e.g., to prove Mr. Johnson's intent, but not to show that he 
acted in conformity with past behavior, etc.; and/or, (3) to have moved for a mistrial. See 
Mackey v. Russell, 148 Fed. Appx. 355 (6th Cir. 2005). 
Indeed, the situation here is egregious in comparison to counsel's performance in 
16 
Mackey. In Mackey, counsel actually had made periodic and non-specific objections to 
404(b) evidence that was used primarily for impeachment evidence. But here, no 
objections were made at all, and it is obvious from the record that appellee was using the 
evidence to prove that appellant was acting in conformity with his violent character. 
Moreover, even though there was a limiting instruction given pertaining to Mr. 
Johnson's alleged theft and drug activities, there never was any discussion between the 
parties and the Court (let alone a limiting instruction) as to whether Mr. Johnson's alleged 
belt choking and attempted murder of a fetus was unduly prejudicial. Thus, counsel's 
deficiencies here are far worse than those found by the Sixth Circuit in Mackey. To 
determine prejudice, this Court must assess the impact of counsel's errors collectively. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696-96. 
Obviously the evidence was prejudicial by portraying the character of Mr. Johnson 
as a violent person. The danger of such evidence was that the jury might infer that he 
acted in conformity with his alleged, past behavior. Prejudice must be presumed in 
conformity with the legislative mandate of Rule 404(b ). Moreover, since this was a 
purely circumstantial case, i.e., there was no direct evidence that Mr. Johnson had 
committed the crime, this error could have very easily effected the outcome of the trial 
(See discussion of prejudice in part IV of brief). The situation is grossly different from 
that in Hamilton, where the overall strength of the prosecution's case was high. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. 
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2. Failure to Assert the Marital Privilege 
Pursuant to Rule 502(b)(2) of Utah's Rules ofEvidence, marital communications 
are privileged, and Mr. Johnson had the right to preclude the appellee's use of statements 
made to his wife during the course of their marriage. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1997). Defense counsel also failed to object under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to the 
undisclosed and incredibly damaging statements allegedly made by Mr. Johnson to his 
wife during the course of their marriage. Those statements were that Mr. Johnson: (1) 
had other people killed for saying certain things that his wife had said to him; (2) could 
put his fist through the back of his wife's head; (3) while commenting on the O.J. 
Simpson trial, stated to his wife that he could also get away with murder; and, ( 4) had told 
his wife that he would kill their baby in front of her just to make her suffer ( R. 615, p. 
159: 9-11). Such suppositions (even if true) can hardly be viewed as anything but 
unbridled musings, rather than declarations of intent to commit a crime. That is, the 
statements did not involve a crime committed against Mrs. Johnson, or anyone else in the 
home. Indeed, the statements could hardly be construed as harassment (U.C.A. S 
76-5-106) or assault (U.C.A. S 76-5-102), because mere statements about hypothetical 
violence are not crimes in Utah, unless associated with a simultaneous show of force, or if 
they are in writing. Consequently, use of these statements at trial were objectionable 
under the marital communication evidentiary rule, and there probative value was 
questionable. The statements were thus inherently prejudicial for the reasons stated 
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supra. 
3. Failure to Object to Appellee's Misrepresentation of Material Facts 
If a prosecutor suggests unreasonable inferences or misstates the facts in closing 
argument, defense counsel's failure to object is unreasonable, unless part of a viable trial 
strategy. See State v. Lord, 128 Wash.App. 216, 114 P.3d 1241 (2005). In this instance, 
one of the material facts appellee needed to prove was the opportunity for Mr. Johnson to 
commit the crime. The evidence at trial was that there was a window of at least two hours 
when the murder could have occurred. That is, Chris's grandmother had spoken to him at 
7:30P.M., and Ms. Mosier did not discovery her dead son until around 9:30P.M. Thus, 
it was patently unreasonable for Mr. Johnson's attorneys not to argue against the 
appellee's representation to the jury, that the murder occurred between 7:40 to 7:50P.M. 
( R. 617, p. 519,1. 15-16). 
Indeed, as here, where defense counsel in essence corroborated the appellee's 
theory by materially misstating Ms. Mossier's time for discovering the body during 
closing argument, i.e., around 8:00P.M., rather than around 9:30P.M., and assumed 
arguendo, that appellee's time line for the murder was correct ( R., 617, p. 488, 1. 4-15), 
the error cannot be viewed as anything but negligence, and materially unreasonable ( R. 
617, p. 487, 1. 11; R. 615, p. 94, 1. 10-24 ). In conjunction with the other material errors 
stated, its effect was cumulative, and the prejudice must be inferred as material, given the 
circumstantial nature ofthe case. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
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4. Failure to Object to Inflammatory Remarks During 
Closing Argument. 
Inflammatory remarks made during closing argument by the prosecutor may 
warrant reversal. The test is: (1) did the remarks draw the jury's attention to matters that 
they were not justified in hearing; and, (2) were the jury probably influenced by the 
remarks. State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). Generallly a prosecutor may not 
create evidence through arguments or statements of personal belief. Mott v. Iowa, 695 
N.W.2d 43 (2004). References to defense witnesses as a pack ofliars had been 
condemned as plainly out of bounds. State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 
1999). It is also improper for a prosecutor to call the defendant a liar, or to state that the 
defendant is a liar. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003). Where as here 
the prosecutor called Mr. Johnson a liar 12 times ( R. 615, pp. 525, I. 12; 527, I. 5; 529, I. 
5), it is reasonable to infer that the prosecutor's statements impermissibly inflamed the 
jury, and in light of the circumstantial nature of the State's evidence, could have impacted 
the verdict. Thus, appellee's use of the liar statements was inherently prejudicial, and 
defense counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable. 
5. Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Appellee's 
DNA Expert. 
During the cross examination of the appellee's DNA expert, John Gabriel Bier, Mr. 
Johnson's lawyer failed to adduce a clear understanding of the problems with the expert's 
methodology and results. Indeed, the Court repeatedly admonished defense counsel to 
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make a better record of what it was he was trying to accomplish through cross 
examination(R.617,pp.438,1.13-15;439,1.18-20;440,1.11-17, 19-20). More 
specifically, defense counsel: (1) failed to elicit from Mr. Beir by cross examination why 
failure to utilize a substrate control was material ( R. 617, p. 434-442); (2) actually 
elicited from Mr. Beir that his failure to use a substrate control was immaterial, because 
another company, i.e., Seri, had used a substrate control to conduct its testing ( R. 617, p. 
436, I. 2-4); (3) elicited testimony that the odds that Seri's DNA research was wrong was 
294,000 to 1 ( R. 617, p. 435, 1. 24); and, (4) elicited testimony from Mr. Beir that use of 
a substrate control is irrelevant ( R. 617, p. 438, 1. 15-18). Then, during closing argument, 
defense counsel never objected to appellee calling Mr. Beir's testimony definitive proof 
that it had matched Mr. Johnson's blood on his baby's blanket by DNA evidence ( R. 617, 
p. 528, I. 11). 
In its response in opposition to defendant's motion to renew 23B motion to remand 
for an evidentiary hearing, appellee argued that the evidence before the jury was that: ( 1) 
appellee's DNA expert did not use a substrate control; (2) the jury knew that appellee's 
match of blood samples between Mr. Johnson and the decedent's blood on the former's 
baby's blanket was questionable because of that; and, (3) that defense counsel (by 
implication) had adequately impeached the DNA expert on this point. 
Yet the facts do not imply these conclusions. That is, appellee's DNA expert, Mr. 
Beir testified that the victim's sample of blood matched the stain that he had taken from 
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the blanket. ( R. 617, p. 416, I. 12-14). Appellee also elicited testimony from Mr. Beir 
that the statistical probability that Mr. Johnson's blood was found on his baby's blanket as 
3.8 million to 1 ( R. 617, p. 417, I. 3 ). Consequently, it is wrong to infer that defense 
counsel's arguments provided sufficient impeachment of Mr. Beir. 
Finally, defense counsel only argued during his closing argument, the flaws 
associated with Mr. Beir's testimony, rather than using a DNA expert in rebuttal ( R. 
617, p. 492, I. 15). Thus, defense counsel's statements were not evidence, and there was 
no basis for the jury to believe anything that defense counsel argued at closing on this 
subject. Thus, it is reasonable to infer prejudice. 
6. Failure to Call a DNA Expert Witness was Ineffective. 
In Utah, whether defense counsel is ineffective for not calling an expert witness to 
testify at trial is viewed from the perspective of whether such a decision is a reasonable 
tactical decision. See Fedorowicz v. State, 2005 WL 231927 (Utah App.) 2005 UT App 
405 (2006). Such a decision is only reasonable, if upon consultation with an expert, 
effective cross examination is performed, e.g., material impeachme·nt evidence is elicited. 
Jones v. Suthers, 130 Fed. Appx. 235, 242 (101h Cir. 2005). 
In contrast to Fedorowicz, defense counsel in this instance used an expert witness 
to assist him with his cross examination preparation of appellee's expert witness. The 
apparent trial tactic of defense counsel was to get appellee's witness to admit on the stand 
that his DNA testing was flawed (based on defense counsel's prior discussions with Dr. 
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Johnson), thus rendering Mr. Beir's testimony inconclusive. But this did not happen. 
Rather, Mr. Beir testified that his failure to use a substrate control was immaterial to his 
scientific opinion, and that the DNA on Mr. Johnson's baby's blanket was the victim's 
( R. 617, p. 438, l. 15-18). That such testimony would occur was a reasonable possibility, 
which defense counsel should have anticipated. Thus, it was incumbent upon defense 
counsel to anticipate this problem, and have Dr. Johnson available to impeach the 
credibility of Mr. Beir as a rebuttal witness. See State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis.2d 777, 
792; 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998); Hicks v. State, 443 S.E.2d 907,908 (S.C. 1994). 
That such testimony was readily available is obvious. Dr. Johnson's affidavit 
states that: "a DNA profile cannot be absolutely attributed to a bloodstain if a substrate 
control is not tested." Her qualifications for exceed that of Mr. Beir. Dr. Johnson's 
affidavit also points out that: ( 1) the relevance of the lightness of the bloodstains on the 
baby blanket as well as the lack of blood on the defendant's clothing was not adequately 
explained, because: (a) if Mr. Johnson had murdered Mr. Mosier, he should have had a lot 
ofblood on his body and clothing; and, (b) Mr. Mossier's blood stain could have been on 
the blanket previously (supported by the fact that Mr. Mossier liked the baby, picked up 
the baby, and had access to the baby regularly and for several weeks prior to the murder); 
and, (2) it is not unusual to find a small amount of a the victim's blood on a random 
object, and that DNA testing does not reveal how or when a stain was deposited. Since 
defense counsel did not elicit any of these admissions from Mr. Beir, his use of an expert 
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witness was ineffective under Fedorowicz. 
Indeed, instead of utilizing Dr. Johnson as a rebuttal expert, defense counsel used 
the information garnered from Dr. Johnson to argue her unsupported assertions during his 
closing argument. This clearly was unreasonable, as defense counsel was not an expert, 
and the jury never heard any of the available evidence to impeach Mr. Beir's assertions 
from Dr. Johnson directly. Indeed, it is not speculative to infer tha1t Dr. Johnson's 
testimony would have been irrelevant, because her readily available testimony could have 
created doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the materiality of Mr. Beir's testimony. 
Thus, it is reasonable to infer prejudice on this point as well. 
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT MERITS REVERSAL. 
Whether prosecutorial misconduct merits reversal is based upon the following 
factors: ( 1) whether the behavior drew attention to matters which were not properly 
before the jury; and, (2) whether the defendant suffered prejudice. See State v. Colwell, 
994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000). Mr. Johnson incorporates by reference the arguments he has 
made in part II., sections 1, 2 and 4 of this brief for this issue. In these sections, it is clear 
that the prosecutor impermissibly used 404(b) evidence and slandered Mr. Johnson 
repeatedly during her closing argument. Based upon these arguments, he concludes that 
the prosecutor did impermissibly draw attention to these issues, and that it is reasonable to 
infer that Mr. Johnson suffered prejudice by the prosecutor's actions. 
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IV. APPELLEE'S CASE WAS WEAK, AND PREJUDICE RESULTED. 
1. General Considerations 
An appellate court should overturn a conviction under either an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim or a prosecutorial misconduct claim, when the conviction is 
not strongly supported by the record, and the errors materially contributed to the unjust 
verdict. See State v. Templin, 805 P .2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). Under the authorities 
cited, Mr. Johnson makes cogent arguments as to why there was ineffectiveness and 
prosecutorial misconduct. For the following reasons, Mr. Johnson also contends, that 
because of these errors, there is also reasonable doubt as to whether the jury verdict is 
correct. 
In this instance, Mr. Johnson was only found guilty of murder by circumstantial 
evidence. The prosecution took place approximately 10 years after the murder had 
occurred. Thus, there was an inherent danger that the witnesses memories had faded by 
the time of trial. 
There was no eye witness to the crime, there was no murder weapon found and 
there was no cogent motive presented. Indeed, the testimony of the decedent's mother, 
i.e., the most potentially hostile witness in appellee's case, was that Chris and Mr. 
Johnson got along well. 
Additionally, during the ten year hiatus from murder to prosecution, Mr. Johnson 
never admitted that he had killed the boy. This seems odd, in light of the evidence that 
25 
Mr. Johnson apparently had no problem in presenting himself in a bad light on a variety 
of occasions. 
2. The DNA Evidence was Seriously Flawed and Misused. 
Appellee introduced evidence from a non-Ph.D., DNA expert. His testimony was 
that the decedent's blood was on Mr. Johnson's baby's blanket. However, this evidence 
was not cogent. Indeed, the DNA expert used by defense counsel in preparation for trial, 
i.e., Dr. Johnson, stated that in light of defense counsel's failure to cross-examine Mr. 
Bear adequately, the outcome of Mr. Johnson's trial could have been negatively affected. 
Indeed, Dr. Johnson's concerns were that: (1) there was a lack of blood on Mr. 
Johnson's clothing; (2) it would not have been unusual to find the decedent's DNA on the 
baby's blanket (because the decedent had daily contact with the baby (including holding 
the baby)); and, (3) failure to perform a substrate control meant that it was impossible to 
determine whether the blood was from the decedent, or whether his saliva or some other 
source was superimposed over the blood (thus giving a false positive). Dr. Johnson was 
available to provide this cogent rebuttal evidence. 
Yet the prosecutor during closing argument repeatedly called the DNA evidence a 
match. Appellee in its response to Mr. Johnson's renewed Rule 23B motion states that 
Mr. Beir did not absolutely state that there was a match. Although this may be true, Mr. 
Beir did provide astronomical probabilists that the blood samples were a match. But 
more importantly, the prosecutor called it a match- repeatedly. Thus, the prosecutor's 
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unimpeached mischaracterization could have persuaded the jury to convict an innocent 
man. 
Additionally, and as Dr. Johnson suggests, the fact that there was no blood found 
on Mr. Johnson's body or clothing is highly material. The decedent died of35 stab 
wounds. There was evidence of a struggle. Mr. Johnson met with police shortly after the 
boy had been killed. Prior to meeting with the police, Mr. Johnson was so intoxicated, 
that he had called his ex-wife to give him a ride home. To think that Mr. Johnson in this 
highly intoxicated condition would have had the presence of mind and ability to clean 
every speck of blood off his body and clothes (even ifhe had the opportunity to use his 
friend's bathroom for a few minutes to do so) and be able to hide this evidence from 
trained homicide detectives shortly after the murder, is highly improbable. These facts in 
and of themselves indicates extreme doubt that the verdict is correct. 
3. The Character Evidence was Highly Prejudicial. 
The prosecutor impermissibly introduced very damaging character evidence that 
Mr. Johnson was a wife beater and a baby killer. She also repeatedly called him a liar 
during closing argument. The Legal Defenders did not object to any of these highly 
inflammatory remarks. It is an ancient rule of evidence that one cannot use prior bad acts 
to prove that a person acted in conformity with his character. The policy associated with 
this rule is that society does not want innocent persons in prison as a result of prior and 
irrelevant behavior. This evidence in and of itself may have caused a bad conviction, and 
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was highly prejudicial 
4. The Other Evidence was not Compelling. 
The rest of appellee's evidence was less than compelling. As noted, appellee's 
time line theory was highly flawed, because Mr. Johnson's window of opportunity to kill 
the decedent was two hours, rather than 5 minutes (as represented by the prosecutor 
during closing argument). 
The evidence about a missing kitchen knife from Mr. Johnson's house was not 
overly material. Indeed, Mr. Johnson's ex-wife testified that she never spoke to Mr. 
Johnson about the knife ( R. 615, p. 141, l. 4-5), and that dust had accumulated in the 
block where the knife had been placed ( R. 615, p. 140, l. 1-6). Thus, it is reasonable to 
infer that the knife had been missing long before the murder had ev,er taken place. It 
would also have been reasonable to infer that there could have been any number of 
plausible explanations for why the knife had been missing from the kitchen around the 
time of the murder (especially in light of the fact that the testimony occurred nearly 10 
years after the incident). 
Additionally, appellee's theory for the murder was that Mr. Johnson killed the boy, 
because he was a drug addict, and had wanted to steal something to pawn for his drug 
use. Although it is inherently far fetched to think that a drug user would kill someone to 
get high, the facts here, also belie such a conclusion. For example, if Mr. Johnson had 
killed the boy, and had picked up the baby in the process, presumably the baby would 
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have been traumatized, and would have had blood on himself and his clothing. Neither 
occurred, according to the testimony of Mr. Hassan, i.e., the baby was not crying when 
Mr. Johnson entered Mr. Hassan's home ( R. 615, p. 182, 1. 4; p. 181, 1. 10-11). 
Additionally, Mr. Johnson was employed, and actually had left from work on the 
night of the murder before picking up the baby. Thus, it seems unreasonable to infer that 
Mr. Johnson needed to kill the boy simply to get money to get high, because he should 
have had money in his pocket from his wages. 
Lastly, appellee called as a witness a convicted felon for a crime involving 
dishonesty, i.e., receiving stolen property, ( R. 616, p. 344). The witness's name was 
Matthew Alan Rushton. In 2002, he was apparently a cell mate of Mr. Johnson's. Thus, 
it can hardly be said that the statements made by Mr. Rushton were persuasive of Mr. 
Johnson's guilt. 
Consequently, based upon the other material facts presented by appellee, it can 
hardly be said that it presented a compelling case against the accused. Thus, the cited 
errors are material, and may have easily skewed the outcome of the trial. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
REGARDING THE 404(B) EVIDENCE. 
Whether a trial court errs in permitting the jury to hear overly prejudicial evidence 
is viewed from the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Gurbransen, 106 P .3d 734, 7 40 
(Utah 2005). In this instance, the trial court held that the prosecution's use of the 
undisclosed domestic violence evidence was relevant, i.e., the choking of his ex-wife with 
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a belt, and the attempted murder of a fetus, to lay a foundation for Mr. Johnson's drug 
habit, and to show that Mr. Johnson's ex-wife was reluctant to disclose information 
against him. This ruling was an abuse of discretion for four reasons. 
First, Utah R. Evid. 404(b) requires notice of intention to use such evidence prior 
to trial. This issue was never addressed by the Trial Court in its ruling. The notice 
requirement is undoubtedly there to prevent undue surprise, and insure a fair trial, 
especially for serious cases such as this one. Thus, prejudice should be presumed when a 
prosecutor springs such materially harmful evidence during the course of trial, given the 
legislative mandate for such notice 
Secondly, Rule 404(b) evidence can only be used for very specific non-character 
purposes, i.e., to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. There is no articulated purpose by the legislature to 
use such evidence either for: (1) laying a foundation for other 404(b) evidence; or, (2) to 
show a witness's reluctance to disclose information about a defendant. Indeed, in light of 
the great danger in having a jury believe that a defendant acted in conformity with his 
past behavior, the legislature has limited the use of Rule 404(b) evidence in a very narrow 
way. 
Thirdly, a court must conduct Rule 403 balancing before allowing Rule 404(b) 
evidence. State v. Kirkwood, 47 P.3d Ill (Utah App. 2002). The lower court not only 
failed to articulate a reason for allowing the evidence under Rule 403, it allowed appellee 
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to use Rule 404(b) evidence for an impermissible purpose, e.g., to establish foundation 
for Mr. Johnson's drug habit Such was an abuse of discretion, and inherently prejudicial 
for the reasons stated above. 
Fourth, Mr. Johnson's ex-wife testified that she was not afraid of him, and that she 
believed he did not kill the boy. Thus, the reasoning of the Court for allowing the 
evidence, i.e., to show the ex-wife's reluctance to say something bad about Mr. Johnson, 
is simply incorrect factually. Since there was no legal basis for the introduction of the 
evidence, the error was an abuse of discretion, and for the reasons stated, inherently 
prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the objective standards set forth in Strickland, there was ineffective 
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of discretion by the Court. In 
light of the overall weakness of appellee's case, the prejudicial effect of these errors is 
apparent. Consequently the verdict must be vacated in the name of justice, compassion 
and reason, and Mr. Johnson should be afforded a new trial. 
y submitted, 
{/ftdt( 
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DECLARATION OF ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON 
I, Elizabeth A. Johnson do hereby declare and S\\ear as follows: 
1. I received a B.S. degree in chemistry in 1982 from Wofford College in Spartanburg, SC 
and a Ph.D. degree in immunology in 1987 from the Medical University of South 
Carolina. My formal education also includes four years of post-doctoral training in the 
field of molecular biology and DNA analysis at the Medical University of SC and at MD 
Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas. 
2. I have been a forensic scientist for fourteen years. I was hired to establish the DNA 
12 laboratory within the Harris County Medical Examiners Office in Houston, Texas in 
13 1991, and I was the director of that laboratory. I also assumed supervision of their 
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serology laboratory in 1996. I personally implemented and validated both RFLP-
( chemiluminescent detection) and PCR-based DNA analysis in this laboratory. I was a 
Senior Forensic Scientist at Technical Associates, Inc., Ventura, California from 
February 1997 until May 2003 and performed and supervised both RFLP and PCR-base 
testing including DQA 1, Polymarker, D 1 S80 and various STR multiplex systems. I 
have performed evidence examinations in hundreds of cases and performed DNA 
analyses on several thousand samples. I am currently in private practice performing 
forensic science consultation. 
3. I co-developed the multiplex system that allows the co-amplification of the Amelogenin 
gene in a single reaction with the six Polymarker loci, and I have performed validation 
on this multiplex system and that the manuscript describing this technique and its 
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4. 
5. 
validation has been published by the peer reviewed Journal of Forensic Sciences, 
January, 1997. I have experience with the area of developmental research and validation 
of PCR based forensic DNA test systems because of this work. In addition to this, I 
have presented numerous papers and posters at scientific meetings dealing with many of 
the techniques developed by the laboratories with which I have been employed. I also 
have numerous publications in the area of medical research. I regularly attend forensic 
science meetings and stay abreast of the current literature in this field. I am a member o 
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and the Association of Forensic DNA 
Analysts and Administrators, and I hold a Certification of Qualification as a Laboratory 
Director in Forensic Identity by the State of New York (issued 8/12/02 and expires 
8/12/06). I have been an invited speaker at universities and colleges, professional Bar 
Associations and legal conferences to speak on various issues of DNA analysis, evidence 
examination, and crime laboratories. 
I am a court qualified expert in the field of Criminalistics and DNA analysis, and I have 
been appointed by courts of various jurisdictions in California and other states to consult 
on and/or perform PCR- and RFLP-based DNA typing in numerous criminal cases and 
have testified as an expert on both PCR- and RFLP-based DNA analysis for both the 
defense and prosecution many times. 
I was retained by attorney John O'Connell, Jr. in the case of People v. Terry Johnson to 
review and advise on forensic biology and DNA matters prior to the defendant's trial. I 
have now been contacted by attorney Theodore W eckel in the appellate matter of this 
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case. I have reviewed discovery which initially included offense reports as well as 
laboratory notes and reports from the Utah Crime Laboratory and a report from 
Serological Research Institute (SERI). I have recently reviewed trial transcripts pages 
405-442 which include the direct and cross examination testimony of the State's 
scientific expert, Gabriel Bier, and pages 489-495 of Mr. O'Connell's closing remarks. 
6. In my opinion several subjects were not adequately explained to the jury by the State's 
witness, and the lack of adequate explanation could have negatively affected Mr. 
Johnson's case. 
7. The relevance of lightness of the bloodstains on the baby blanket as well as the lack of 
13 blood on the defendant's clothing was not adequately explained. In a case such as this 
14 that involves multiple stab wounds and a large amount of blood at the scene on the 
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carpet, it is reasonable to expect to find some blood on the clothing or shoes of the 
perpetrator and none was detected by the criminalist. This latter point was not clarified 
at trial. Furthermore, the fact that two apparent bloodstains stains on the baby blanket 
were very light is extremely significant. This could be consistent with older stains that 
had been washed since being deposited as opposed to being fresh transfer or direct 
deposit stains. 
8. Also, the fact that the DNA from one apparent bloodstain stain on the blanket was very 
minimal in quantity, degraded, and produced a partial DNA profile and that no DNA wa 
detected from another stain is significant but was not adequately explained to the jury. 
A very small, fresh bloodstain contains ample DNA to obtain a complete profile since 
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PCR testing (the method used by Mr. Bier in this case) is extremely sensitive. If 
biological stains are stored under proper laboratory condxtions, the DNA contained 
within even a small bloodstain can remain non-degraded for many years and a complete 
DNA profile can be obtained from such a sample. Biological material that has been 
subjected to any of a variety of insults such as sunlight, dirt, chemicals, and bacteria 
which grow under moist conditions will suffer from degradation to varying degrees. In 
this process, the DNA within the cells in the stain (blood, saliva, tissue, etc.) will begin 
to breakdown into smaller and smaller pieces. Because of degradation the DNA strands 
can break down so completely that no DNA test results may be obtained from even a 
large visible stain. Alternatively, degradation can result in a partial break down of the 
DNA strands so that some of the smaller sections of DNA can still be typed and a partial 
DNA profile may be obtained. Forensic laboratories today typically test using short 
tandem repeats (STRs) and test DNA at 9 or 13 locations (loci) along the DNA strand. 
In this case, Mr. Bier tested two stains from the baby blank,et at 13 loci. On stain Q I Mr. 
Bier obtained extremely weak results at only 5 loci and no results at the remaining loci. 
The results on Q I are consistent with both a very minimal stain containing very little 
biological material as well as with the DNA being degraded. Such a stain could have 
been present on the blanket for some time and undergone de:gradation, and it may have 
been washed which would contribute to the loss of biological material as well as to 
degradation. Mr. Bier obtained no results at all on stain Q2 which was also very light. 
The victim had routine contact with the child and had contact with the baby blanket on 
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9. 
the day of his death and possibly on prior occasions. It was not adequately explained to 
the jury that it would not be unexpected to find a small amount of the victim's blood or 
some other of his DNA-containing t1uids on the blanket, and that DNA testing does not 
reveal how or when a stain was deposited. 
Another topic that was not adequately explained is that of contamination. Samples of 
very low DNA quantity and quality such as Q 1 are easily contaminated with more 
concentrated sources ofDNA. Contamination can occur in the laboratory if reference 
samples (such as the known sample from the victim or defendant) or other sources of 
high quantity DNA are inadvertently introduced into the compromised sample. Extreme 
care and caution must be used in the handling of minimal samples in order to avoid 
contamination since PCR testing is capable of detecting DNA from just a few cells. 
Contamination can also occur during the collection of evidence if a person carelessly 
handles one item containing a bloodstain, for example, and then handles another item 
without changing gloves or instruments. In this case Mr. Bier processed the victim's 
reference sample in the same quantification, amplification, and detection runs as the Q 1 
and Q2 stains from the baby blanket. Although from his lab notes Mr. Bier appears to 
have taken some precautions to avoid cross contamination, contamination of the blanket 
sample with a small amount ofDNA from the victim's reference sample could have 
occurred if he had not changed his gloves or exercised extreme care in working with the 
two types of samples together. Detection of this type of error would usually not be 
possible through a review oflab notes either by an internal or external reviewer if the 
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contamination involved a sample and not a blank. 
10. Also, Mr. Bier did not analyze substrate controls with the samples from the baby blanket 
and the importance of this topic was not adequately explained. With an apparent 
bloodstain on fabric, an analyst would collect a portion of the apparent bloodstain for 
DNA testing. In addition, the analyst should collect and st:~parately test a similar sized 
portion of unstained fabric that is taken as close to the visible stain as possible, and this 
latter sample is called a "substrate control". Saliva, tears, nasal fluid, vaginal secretions 
are all examples of biological sources of cells that contain DNA but which usually do 
not produce a visible stain. If cells from one or more of these fluids are superimposed 
with an old bloodstain which no longer contains type-able DNA due to degradation or 
low quantity, the DNA result that is obtained may be mistaken as originating from blood 
when in fact it may be from one of these other fluids. If a substrate control is run as 
described above and shows DNA in the background around the stain, an analyst must 
cautiously interpret the data he or she gets from the apparent bloodstained area. It may 
not be possible to tell if the source of a DNA profile, even it is from one individual, is 
from blood, saliva or both if additional testing is not performed. A DNA profile cannot 
be absolutely attributed to a bloodstain if a substrate control is not tested. Mr. Bier 
incorrectly stated (p 4 3 3) that testing a substrate control is only used to reconcile 
problems as with mixtures. Assisting with mixture interpretation is not the only use for 
substrate control, and it overlooks its primary value, that is, to assist an analyst in 
knowing what type of cellular material a DNA profile may or may not be from. In this 
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case Mr. Bier did not run substrate controls when he tested the light apparent bloodstains 
on the baby blanket, however, SERI did so in 1994 when they tested stains from two 
blankets using a different type of PCR testing. The results from SERI show that there 
was a low level of DNA in the substrate controls taken from both blankets, but because 
the test kits they used were different from those used by Mr. Bier in 2002 the data from 
the two labs cannot be directly compared. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that those 
matters stated upon information and belief are true to the best of my knowledge. 
Executed on this 22nd day ofNovember 2005, at Ventura County, California. 
. Johnson, Ph.D. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
TERRY LOUIS JOHNSON, Case No. 02J-901094FS 
(ba_ v ve ++ 
Defendant. 
The State, by and through it's attorneys, Katie Bernards-Goodman and Fred 
Burmester, Deputy District Attorneys, herein submit it's Findings of Facts, Conclusion 
of Law and Order regarding Defendant's Motion For a New Trial. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 30, 1993 Christopher Mosier, a 14 year old child, was 
babysitting Defendant Terry Louis Johnson's baby at the Mosier's home at 
4525 South 1175 West #83 in Salt Lake County. Christopher's mother had 
been scheduled to tend the baby, however, she had been called in to work and 
had left the baby with Christopher. 
2. At 7:30p.m. on December 30, 1993, Christopher's grandmother, Gladys 
Mosier, called Christopher to make sure everything was fine. Christopher 
talked to his grandmother on the phone, letting her know that the baby was 
still there, and everything was fine. 
3. Between 7:40 and 7:45p.m. (by Defendant's own admissions) Defendant 
Johnson came to the Mosier residence to pick up his child. 
4. At 7:45p.m. and 8:00p.m., Christopher Mosier's mother, Sylvia Mosier, 
called Christopher from her work to check on him. There was no answer. 
5. At 8:30p.m. Linda Johnson, Defendant's wife, arrived at the Mosier home to 
pick up the baby. She had been scheduled to pick up the baby that evening. 
Linda knocked on the door. There was no answer. She went home and began 
to make calls to locate her baby. 
6. At 9:15 p.m., Sylvia Mosier retumed home to find her son, Christopher, 
stabbed to death. The baby was not in the home. There was no forcible 
entrance into the residence, and the only items missing were a camcorder and 
a bar of soap from the bathroom. 
7. At 9:30p.m., Defendant called his wife, Linda, from a friend's home (Magde 
Hassan's home), and tells Linda to come and pick up the baby. Linda 
responds to Hassan's residence and picks up the baby. 
8. When Linda retums to Defendant's and her apartment, the police are waiting. 
The police take the baby's clothing and blanket into evidence. 
9. Police call Defendant at Hassan's and tell him to come home to his apartment. 
Defendant and Hassan arrive and are taken to the police station for 
questioning. 
10. Hassan tells police that Defendant went in the bathroom of Hassan's 
apartment and spent some time cleaning up when he first arrived at Hassan's. 
Defendant was not wearing a coat (which Linda said he always wore). 
11. Defendant changed the baby's clothing. (The baby clothes taken into 
evidence were not the clothing the baby was wearing when Sylvia left the 
baby with Christopher). Defendant left a bar of soap in Hassan's bathroom 
12. Hassan further admitted that he and the Defendant used drugs that evening. 
Years later, Hassan admitted he and defendant drove to the shelter so 
defendant could buy more drugs that evening. 
13. Defendant tells police that he picked up his baby, everything was fine, and 
then he went home and changed his clothing and went to Hassan's. Police ask 
Defendant for the clothing and shoes he had been wearing earlier that evening. 
He promises to turn those items in. 
14. The next morning, on December 31, 1993, Defendant returned to Hassan's 
apartment. He told Hassan that he would never stab anyone 15 or 16 times 
and apologized for causing Hassan to be questioned by the police. 
15. On December 31, 1993 Medical Examiner, Dr. Ed. Leis examined Christopher 
Mosier's body finding he had been stabbed repeatedly. Christopher suffered 
approximately 15 primary stab wounds to his abdomen, chest, and back; and 
additional defensive grazing and cut wounds to his arn1s and hands. This 
information was not released to the press. 
16. In the first week ofJanuary, 1994, defendant's wife, Linda Johnson, noticed 
that the largest butcher knife was missing from her set of knifes. Linda had 
often found items from her and Defendant's apartment missing. She knew the 
defendant had a drug problem and would steal things and pawn them to 
support his habit. 
17. Defendant turned in some items of clothing that had been washed. Defendant 
never surrendered the boots he had been wearing that evening, or the coat he 
had been wearing that evening. 
18. Over the next several months, the Defendant and Linda Johnson's relationship 
deteriorated. Defendant engaged in domestic violence and threats against 
Linda, where he would tell Linda he had "killed for less". In one 
conversation, he told Linda he "could kill someone and walk by the police 30 
seconds later and they would never know." 
19. On November 9, 2001 Detective Todd Park resubmitted evidence from this 
case to the Utah State Crime Lab. Among that evidence was the baby's 
clothing and blanket. Criminologist Gab Bier tested said items for DNA and 
on January 15, 2002 issued a report indicating that the victim's blood had 
been identified on the baby's blanket. 
20. Detective Park located Defendant Johnson and interviewed him and placed 
him under arrest. Defendant admitted that he had a drug problem during the 
time frame of the murder. 
21. While Defendant was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Detention Center 
awaiting trial, he was housed with Matthew Rushton. Defendant offered Mr. 
Rushton $100,000.00 if he would tell police that he knew of someone else 
who had broken into the Mosier's apartment and killed Christopher and stolen 
the camcorder. Defendant provided details for Rushton such as how the 
victim answered the door and how much blood should be at the scene, on his 
baby's blanket, and on the soap. 
22. On June 22, 2004 Defendant came before a jury trial in Judge William W. 
Barrett's court. On June 24, 2004, the jury found Defendant guilty as 
charged. 
23. Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial claiming that the trial court erred by 
allowing evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts in violation of rules 404(b) 
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; that the prosecutor violated Rule 
17(g)(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by engaging in improper 
rebuttal; that the prosecutor violated Rule 3.4(e) ofthe Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct by discussing matters not in evidence and arguing a 
lower standard of proof; and ineffective assistance of counsel because defense 
counsel did not call rebuttal witnesses, present a DNA expert, present an 
alternative motive or make proper objections. 
24. On November 17, 2004, Judge Barrett ruled based on the following: 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. Defendant's prior drug activities were properly admitted under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 402, 403 and 404. Defendant's drug habit was the motive for this 
offense. No other way was available to the State to show this motive than through 
Defendant's ex-wife's testimony of Defendant's thefts to support his habit. 
Specific incidences of domestic violence were elicited as foundation for 
Defendant's statements, (in response to defense's foundation objections at a 
pretrial motion. These incidences also explained Defendant's ex-wife's 
reluctance to initially reveal infom1ation against the Defendant. These issues 
were briefed and argued in pre-trial motions. 
2. The prosecutor did not engage in improper rebuttal. A prosecutor's tactic of 
giving a brief summation in closing and reserving the majority of his time for 
rebuttal is not improper. All ofthe prosecution's comments, made in rebuttal, 
were in direct response to Defendant's closing and were properly made. 
3. The prosecutor did not violate Rule 3.4(e) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct by discussing matters not in evidence and arguing a lower standard of 
proof. The prosecutor referenced a picture that had been previously admitted and 
was relevant. Further, the prosecution properly argued the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. Defense counsel's performance was not ineffective. Defense counsel did present 
alternative motives for the crime, did have an independent DNA expert examine 
the State's results, and presented rebuttal witnesses that were available. Defense 
counsel made proper objections in pretrial hearings as well as at the trial. There is 
no evidence to support a claim that counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness or that the defendant was prejudiced. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion For A New Trial is denied. 
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Dated this~ day o:_;f!;,2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tlmd District Court, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of January, 2005, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER were 
delivered to the following: 
John O'Connell 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert K. Heineman 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Julie George 
29 South State Street, Suite #7 
P.O. Box 112338 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0338 
Jeanne B. Inouye 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 61h Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(Judge will sign in five days if no one objects) 
